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A balanced budget requirement does not only prevent ﬁscal policy makers from smoothing
tax distortions but also aﬀects their preferred choice of government spending. The paper
analyzes the conditions under which groups opposed to government spending might want to
implement a balanced budget requirement in order to induce the government to spend less.
It shows that relaxing a balanced budget requirement need not be associated with higher
government spending.
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1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed an increased interest in institutional constraints on ﬁscal policy
makers, in particular balanced budget requirements. The theoretical interest in such require-
ments has in several countries been accompanied by growing political support. In the United
States, for example, where weak forms of balanced budget rules are implemented in most states1,
a similar rule has repeatedly been suggested for the federal government. In Europe, the “close
to balance” imperative in the European Union’s “Stability and Growth Pact” aims in the same
direction.
By preventing a government from shifting tax collections over time, a balanced budget re-
quirement necessarily goes against the interest of a time-consistent government and, to the
extent that the government is benevolent, society at large. However, as frequently pointed out,
a balanced budget requirement might still play a useful role if it helps avoid that policy makers
pursue third-best policies2 or shift tax collections in an undesirable fashion across or within
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1Cf. Poterba (1994) or Bohn and Inman (1996).
2Tabellini and Alesina (1990), Alesina and Drazen (1991), Chari and Cole (1993), and Persson and Tabellini
(1999) present models where a balanced budget requirement helps overcome third-best policy outcomes due to
common-pool problems.
1cohorts.3
The requirement to balance the budget does not only aﬀect the timing and welfare cost
of tax collections, but also the government’s choice of other policy instruments. In particular,
it is often argued that restrictions on the government’s ability to smooth tax distortions and
thus, to raise revenue relatively cheaply, might reduce government spending.4 According to
this view, groups opposed to government spending might want to implement a balanced budget
requirement in order to “starve the beast.”5
This paper asks whether it is indeed possible that intra-generational conﬂict about the
preferred level of government spending can lead certain groups in the population to favor a
balanced budget requirement. It ﬁnds that the answer to this question does not only depend,
as might be expected, on the severity of tax distortions under a balanced budget and the
extent of conﬂict between diﬀerent groups, but also on whether it is actually the case that
more pronounced tax smoothing goes hand in hand with higher government spending. This
latter condition need not automatically be satisﬁed, as shown by the paper.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes the eﬀects of a balanced budget requirement
on the allocation, in particular the government’s choice of spending, and the welfare of diﬀerent
groups in society. Section 4 brieﬂy discusses extensions and concludes.
2 The Model
The economy is closed and deterministic.6 It is inhabited by a government and a continuum
of households of measure one. Households and the government live from period 0 to period
T.7 Households value sequences of consumption and leisure according to the time-separable
utility measure U(c,x) ≡
PT
t=0 βtu(ct,xt), where ct and xt denote consumption and leisure at
time t, respectively, the felicity function u( ) satisﬁes standard regularity conditions, and β ∈
(0,1) denotes the time discount factor. Households also value the level of “general government
activity”, denoted by g, but to diﬀerent degrees. A fraction η of the consumers (0 ≤ η ≤ 1)—
call them “a-types”—has a relatively strong preference for g, described by the utility measure
ξaf(g) with ξa > 0 and f( ) being strictly increasing and concave. The remaining fraction of
the population—call them “b-types”—has a weaker preference for general government activity,
described by the measure ξbf(g) with ξa > ξb ≥ 0. As in Lucas and Stokey (1983), each
household is endowed with one unit of time per period. Production is linear in labor, with
productivity given by wt.
3For analyses of the inter-generational wealth eﬀects of budget policy, see Diamond (1965), Barro (1974),
Blanchard (1985), and Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoﬀ (1991); for an analysis of the intra-generational wealth
eﬀects, see Niepelt (2004).
4Blinder and Holtz-Eakin (1984) report that “Respondents divided almost evenly among three general argu-
ments in favor [of balancing the budget]: ...[T]hat balancing the budget is a good way to cut wasteful govern-
ment programs” (p. 147). Arguments made in the political debate in many countries appear to conform with
this view. Buchanan and Wagner (1977, p.178) emphasize a diﬀerent eﬀect of balanced budget rules: “The rule
will have the eﬀect of bringing the real costs of public outlays to the awareness of decision makers; it will tend
to dispel the illusory ‘something for nothing’ aspects of ﬁscal choice.” Empirically, there is a clearly identiﬁed
relationship between budgetary institutions and the level of government spending, speciﬁcally investment outlays
(Poterba, 1994; Peletier, Dur and Swank, 1999).
5Krusell, Quadrini and R´ ıos-Rull (1996) examine a related mechanism. In their paper, higher distortions
associated with income rather than consumption taxes depress government transfers.
6The extension to a stochastic environment is immediate.
7The arguments are not aﬀected if T is replaced by ∞ and the following conditions are modiﬁed accordingly.
2The government’s total resource requirement in period t, gt, consists of two parts: Gen-
eral government activity, g, which is chosen by the government, and an exogenous spending
requirement, get:
gt = g + get for all t.
The time-varying exogenous spending component represents expenditures that are incurred even
by a “minimalist” government providing, e.g., national defense, disaster relief, or elementary so-
cial and unemployment insurance. The endogenous spending component, in contrast, represents
government expenditures that go beyond the bare minimum, for public transportation or school-
ing say. Constancy of g reﬂects the notion that the size of government cannot be changed from
year to year.8 Total spending is ﬁnanced by proportional labor-income taxes and government
deﬁcits.
Households behave competitively. They take the sequence of prices of the consumption
good, {pt}T
t=0, and tax rates, {τt}T
t=0, as given and choose consumption, leisure, and government
debt holdings in order to maximize utility. Since general government activity additively enters









pt[(1 − τt)wt(1 − xt) − ct] = 0,
and thus choose the same consumption bundles in equilibrium.
The ﬁrst-order conditions of the households’ program deﬁne consumption and leisure as
functions of productivity, tax, and price sequences. Substituting out prices and tax rates allows
to reduce these ﬁrst-order conditions to a single implementability constraint of the form
T X
t=0
βt[ctuc(ct,xt) − (1 − xt)ux(ct,xt)] = 0. (1)
This implementability constraint summarizes all conditions imposed by household optimization.
In the following, I will use this implementability constraint rather than households’ ﬁrst-order
conditions involving taxes and prices to characterize the equilibrium. Accordingly, I will formu-
late the government’s optimization program without reference to the actual policy instruments
τ and p, but directly in its “primal” form.10
A competitive equilibrium in this economy consists of sequences for consumption and leisure,
and a level of general government activity satisfying the implementability constraint, the econ-
omy’s resource constraints,
wt − gt = ct + wtxt for all t, (2)
0 ≤ xt ≤ 1 for all t,
and, by implication, the government’s budget constraint.11 Under a balanced budget require-
ment, the government must also balance its budget in each period. Equivalently, the government
8The results do not depend on the assumption that endogenous government spending is constant over time.
For example, one could assume instead that endogenous government spending varies over time but its level is
aﬀected by the choice of g. Allowing the government to choose a diﬀerent level of endogenous spending in each
period would shift the focus of the paper away from the link between a balanced budget rule and the size of
government.
9For simplicity, I assume that no debt is outstanding at the beginning of period 0.
10See Lucas and Stokey (1983) for a discussion of the primal approach to the Ramsey problem.
11In equilibrium, a budget deﬁcit is matched by savings of the private sector. The government’s intertemporal
budget constraint is therefore satisﬁed whenever the households’ budget constraints (and thus, the implementabil-
ity constraint) and the resource constraints are satisﬁed.
3must choose an allocation equalizing households’ after-tax labor incomes and consumption in
each period, ct = wt(1−τt)(1−xt) for all t. In its primal form, this zero-savings or budget-balance
condition can be expressed as
ctuc(ct,xt) − (1 − xt)ux(ct,xt) = 0 for all t. (3)
A competitive equilibrium subject to no balanced budget requirement therefore satisﬁes (1) and
(2), while a competitive equilibrium subject to a balanced budget requirement satisﬁes (2) and
(3). Throughout the analysis, I assume equilibria to be interior and government spending to be
feasible, i.e., there exists an ǫ > 0 such that g ≤ ǫ implies wt − gt > 0 for all t.
The government’s objective function is given by a weighted average of household utilities
where θi,i = a,b, denotes the per-capita welfare weight attached to group i. This function can
be interpreted as the objective of a utilitarian social planner (a Benthamite planner if θa = θb).
Alternatively, it provides an approximation of the political decision-making process, for example,
if the government maximizes the welfare of one type subject to a reservation utility requirement
for the other type12, the median voter is decisive13, or parties compete in a probabilistic-voting
environment. The government’s program is thus to
maxg,{ct,xt}T
t=0 f(g)
θaηξa + θb(1 − η)ξb







depending on whether a balanced budget requirement is in place.14
Suppose that a balanced budget rule is introduced in this economy. The requirement to
ﬁnance government spending out of contemporary tax revenues reduces the degrees of freedom
in the maximization problem of the government to one. (Once g is chosen, all tax rates or, in
primal form, equilibrium quantities follow directly from the balanced budget constraint.) The
value of the government’s problem is therefore weakly lower than without a balanced budget
requirement. Why then would a group of households have an interest in a balanced budget
requirement? Several conditions must be satisﬁed:
First, the group in question and the government must disagree about which policy should be
implemented. Only then does it make sense for the interest group to support constraints on the
government’s choice variables. In the setup considered here, where the two types prefer diﬀerent
ﬁscal policies, this condition is met as soon as the government places strictly positive weight on
the welfare of each type. Not only must the government and the interest group disagree about
the preferred policy, but the welfare of the interest group under the constrained policy must be
higher than under the unconstrained policy.
Second, a balanced budget requirement must be enacted on a higher legislative level than
the budget itself to truly represent a constraint to the government. Following the literature
12Denote welfare of type i by U





b for some positive weights θ
a and θ
b, subject to resource and implementability constraints.
Let U
a⋆ and U
b⋆ be the welfare levels and A the allocation solving P. Then, U
a⋆, U
b⋆, and A also solve the
problem of maximizing U
a, subject to the same constraints and the requirement that U
b ≥ U
b⋆.
13For η > 0.5, the median voter setup implies θ
b = 0 and vice versa.
14I assume that the government is able to commit to the ex-ante optimal policy. An extension of the argument
in Lucas and Stokey (1983) shows that the ex-ante optimal policy is time-consistent if the government can commit
to honoring its debt and has access to a wide range of maturities.
4(e.g., Alesina and Perotti, 1995; Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Poterba and von Hagen, 1999), I
assume that this realistic assumption is satisﬁed. (Any theory arguing that a balanced budget
requirement plays any role must make this assumption.) However, this triggers the question
of what the political power constellation must be like for restrictions to be enacted at the
constitutional level which constrain the behavior at the legislative level. One possible explanation
follows the argument of Persson and Svensson (1989) in emphasizing an anticipated change in
the distribution of power.15 Imagine that the ruling party commands a broad majority of
the votes in the legislative branch. This majority allows the party to change the constitution.
Furthermore, imagine that the party expects to lose this broad majority in the upcoming election
and to share power with other parties in a coalition government. If the party represents the
interests of households in favor of constraining the subsequent government, it might want to
enact a balanced budget requirement.
Finally, there must only be a few budgetary institutions available that are suﬃciently simple
and transparent to be practicable and credible (cf. Buchanan and Wagner, 1977, p.176). If
more than just a few such institutions were available, an interest group would try to enact a
diﬀerent, more eﬃcient constraint than a balanced budget rule. Throughout the paper, I assume
a balanced budget requirement to be the only available constitutional constraint.
3 Eﬀects of a Balanced Budget Requirement
To shed further light on the ﬁrst condition discussed above—higher welfare for the interest
group under the constrained than under the unconstrained policy—it is helpful to impose
more structure on the problem. I therefore assume that household preferences are logarith-
mic, u(ct,xt) ≡ ln(ct) + γ ln(xt), f(g) ≡ ln(g). Under this functional form assumption, the















for all t, (5)
respectively. The government program therefore reads
maxg,{ct,xt}T
t=0 ln(g)
θaηξa + θb(1 − η)ξb




βt (ln(ct) + γ ln(xt))
s.t. (2) and
(5) or (4),
depending on whether a balanced budget requirement is in place.
Using (2), ct can be eliminated from the government’s program, leaving xt, t = 0,...,T,
and g as the sole endogenous variables. Under a balanced budget requirement, condition (5)
15Persson and Svensson (1989) analyze how a budget deﬁcit or surplus by one government inﬂuences the
spending decision of the subsequent one. They show that a “conservative” government might run a deﬁcit to
induce a subsequent “liberal” government (favoring higher government expenditure) to spend less. de Figueiredo
Jr. (2003) discusses related empirical evidence in the context of state legislatures granting item vetoes to the
governor.
5pins down xt, t = 0,...,T, reﬂecting the fact that the government has no ability to smooth
tax distortions over time. Without a balanced budget requirement, the equilibrium sequence
for leisure is only constrained by (4) since the government does have the ability to smooth tax





















= 0, t = 1,...,T, (6)
according to which the optimal debt policy equalizes deadweight losses of taxation over time.
These deadweight losses are reﬂected in wedges between the marginal utility of leisure and the
productivity-weighted marginal utility of consumption. The period-t wedge, for example, is
given by







and therefore equal to zero, of course, if no taxes are levied.
Diﬀerentiating the government’s objective function with respect to g yields the ﬁrst-order
condition
θaηξa + θb(1 − η)ξb







wt(1 − xt) − g − get
= 0, (7)
which holds independently of whether a balanced budget requirement is in place.
Two results prove useful for the following discussion. The ﬁrst characterizes the tax smooth-
ing policy around the balanced budget allocation. It follows from evaluating (6) at xt = γ/(1+γ)
for all t:
Lemma 1. Suppose that wt > gt(1 + γ) for all t such that a balanced budget policy is im-
plementable. Consider a marginal increase in xt,t = 1,...,T, around the balanced budget
allocation. The welfare eﬀect of this marginal increase, Vt, is given by
Vt = βt(1 + γ)2 wtg0 − w0gt
(w0 − g0(1 + γ))(wt − gt(1 + γ))
.
The marginal increase in xt and the corresponding reduction of x0 around the balanced budget
allocation therefore raise social welfare, Vt ≥ 0, iﬀ
w0
w0 − g0(1 + γ)
≥
wt







or τ0 ≥ τt.
The second result follows from totally diﬀerentiating (7) with respect to g and xt at the
balanced budget allocation (where (4) governs the eﬀect of a marginal change in xt on x0):
Lemma 2. Suppose that wt > gt(1 + γ) for all t such that a balanced budget policy is im-
plementable. Consider a marginal increase in xt,t = 1,...,T, around the balanced budget






















θaη+θb(1−η) and g is evaluated at its optimal value under the balanced budget
constraint, given by (5) and (7). The marginal increase in xt and the corresponding reduction
of x0 around the balanced budget allocation therefore raise g iﬀ
w0
(w0 − g0(1 + γ))2 ≥
wt
(wt − gt(1 + γ))2.
A comparison of the inequality conditions stated in the two Lemmas shows that Vt ≥ 0 does
not necessarily imply ∆t ≥ 0. A small policy change around the balanced budget allocation
towards tax smoothing need therefore not imply an increase in government spending. Intuitively,
a marginal increase in xt and a corresponding reduction of x0 imply stronger tax smoothing if
they tend to equalize tax distortions in the two periods. Due to identical marginal utilities of
leisure around the balanced budget allocation (see condition (5)), this requires that the marginal
increase in xt and the corresponding reduction of x0 tend to equalize the productivity-weighted
marginal utility of consumption in period 0 and period t. This is the case if the former exceeds
the latter, corresponding to the condition given in Lemma 1. The eﬀect of the policy change on
tax distortions thus depends on marginal utilities.
The eﬀect of the policy change on the level of general government activity, in contrast,
depends on changes in marginal utilities, as can be seen from the condition stated in Lemma 2.
A move towards tax smoothing increases g, if it reduces the opportunity cost of g. (The marginal
beneﬁt of g is unaﬀected by the policy change, due to separability.) This opportunity cost,
reﬂected by the right-hand side of equation (7), is given by the present discounted value of
marginal utility losses due to less resources available for consumption. The eﬀect of more tax
smoothing on this cost depends on the eﬀect on average marginal utilities of consumption and
thus, the derivatives of marginal utility. The cost of g may therefore rise even if the policy
change reduces tax distortions.
Whether the signs of Vt and ∆t diﬀer depends on the factors inﬂuencing marginal utilities,
in particular labor productivity and exogenous government spending. In general, all sign com-
binations may arise. The potential for diﬀerences between the signs of Vt and ∆t disappears,
however, if labor productivity does not vary between periods 0 and t. This can be directly seen
from a comparison of the conditions stated in Lemmas 1 and 2. Therefore, we have the following
result:
Lemma 3. Suppose that wt > gt(1 + γ) for all t such that a balanced budget policy is im-
plementable. Consider a marginal increase in xt,t = 1,...,T, around the balanced budget
allocation. If wt = w0, then sign(Vt) = sign(∆t), i.e., the marginal increase in xt and the
corresponding reduction of x0 induce higher g iﬀ they correspond to stronger tax smoothing.
Building on Lemmas 1–3, we can characterize the marginal welfare eﬀects of a relaxation of
a balanced budget requirement. This allows us to gain further insight into the conditions under
which diﬀerent groups in society disagree about the desirability of (the relaxation of) a balanced
budget requirement.
Relaxing the balanced budget requirement and marginally increasing xt has two eﬀects.
First, it amounts to stronger or weaker tax smoothing, with corresponding welfare eﬀects for all
groups in society as characterized in Lemma 1. Second, it aﬀects g by the amount characterized
in Lemma 2. The change in g, in turn, has two welfare eﬀects. On the one hand, it aﬀects the
utility from government spending, and on the other hand, it aﬀects the utility from equilibrium
consumption. While all groups in society and the government value the latter eﬀect identically,
7they disagree about the valuation of the former if θa,θb > 0 and ξa  = ξb. Formally, the marginal
welfare eﬀects of an increase in xt on a−types, b-types, and the government are given by
Wa

























t = Vt +
 
θaηξa + θb(1 − η)ξb







wt(1 − xt) − g − get
!
∆t = Vt,
respectively, where g is evaluated at its optimal value under the balanced budget constraint,
given by (5) and (7).
Figures 1–4 display these marginal welfare eﬀects due to an increase in x1 as a function of
ge1 under the assumption that T = 1 (corresponding, for example, to a two-period cycle) and
γ = 0.5,β = 1,ge0 = 0.5,w0 = 4,θa = 1,θb = 1,η = .5,ξb = 0. The parameter values for w1 and
ξa diﬀer across the ﬁgures.




1 and ∆1 under the assumption that labor productivity
varies across the two periods (w0 = 4 > w1 = 3). In accordance with the ﬁndings discussed
above, Figure 1 shows that the eﬀect on tax distortions and g need not have the same sign. For
example, a rise in x1 reduces tax distortions and g if ge1 lies in an interval around 0.2.
Figure 2 exempliﬁes the eﬀect of a more pronounced disagreement between a- and b-types
(ξa = 10 rather than ξa = 1 as in Figure 1). The higher level of ξa implies that the equilib-
rium level of g under a balanced budget increases. Relaxing the balanced budget requirement
implies a further increase of g. The welfare implications of higher spending dominate those of
lower tax distortions, and the relaxation of a balanced budget requirement therefore mainly has
distributive implications.




1 and ∆1 under the assumption that labor productivity
does not vary across the two periods (w0 = w1 = 4). In accordance with Lemma 3, the ﬁgures
show the eﬀects on tax distortions and g to have the same sign. Relaxing the balanced budget
requirement therefore leads the government to smooth tax distortions and raise g. As long as
the conﬂict between a- and b-types is not very pronounced, as in Figure 3 where ξa = 1, all
groups in society agree that relaxing the balanced budget constraint is desirable. If, however,
the degree of conﬂict surpasses a threshold, as assumed for Figure 4 where ξa = 10, then b-types
are opposed to relaxing a balanced budget requirement, because such a step goes hand in hand
with signiﬁcantly higher government spending.
Figure 5 displays the welfare eﬀect for b-types, Wb
1, as a function of both w1 and ge1 under
the maintained assumption that intra-generational conﬂict with respect to the desirability of
government spending is high (ξa = 10). All other parameter values are the same as in Figures 1–
4. The ﬁgure shows that b-types are opposed to a marginal rise in x1, if w1 is relatively large.
It is exactly in this parameter region, however, that such a policy change amounts to stronger
tax smoothing and thus, the government’s preferred policy. Similarly, b-types favor a marginal
increase in x1 around the balanced budget allocation, if w1 is relatively small: while such a
policy implies higher tax distortions, it induces the government to spend less. For a wide range
of combinations of w1 and ge1, the government’s interests and those of b-types are therefore
strictly opposed.
8Naturally, disagreement about the desirability of a marginal relaxation of a balanced budget
requirement does not imply disagreement about fully relaxing such a requirement. Nevertheless,
the above conclusion does not change to any great extent when total rather than marginal welfare
eﬀects of relaxing a balanced budget requirement are considered. Solving for the equilibrium
allocations with and without balanced budget requirement in the range of parameter values
underlying Figure 5, it is found that b-types prefer a balanced budget allocation for more than
96 percent of the (w1,ge1) combinations displayed in the ﬁgure. Moving from the allocation
under a balanced budget to the tax-smoothing allocation implemented by the unconstrained
government beneﬁts b-types only if w1 ≈ 4.4 and ge1 ≈ 0.77, and even then only slightly, see
Figure 6. Otherwise, the beneﬁts of tax smoothing are outweighed by the cost of higher induced
government spending.
If the extent of intra-generational conﬂict is signiﬁcantly reduced (ξa = 1), b-types prefer the
imposition of a balanced budget requirement only in 38 percent of the possible constellations,
see Figure 7. Due to the less pronounced disagreement about the preferred level of government
spending, the direct beneﬁts of tax smoothing become more important for b-types. These direct
beneﬁts are particularly strong if w1 is relatively small and ge1 is relatively large.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper has examined the notion that groups opposed to government spending might want to
implement a balanced budget requirement to “starve the beast”, i.e., to induce the government
to spend less.
We have found some theoretical support for this notion. Whether groups opposed to gov-
ernment spending indeed support a balanced budget requirement depends on several factors:
The severity of tax distortions under a balanced budget; the extent of conﬂict between diﬀerent
groups; and the link between tax smoothing and the opportunity cost of government spending.
This link is non-trivial, implying that more pronounced tax smoothing need not go hand in
hand with higher government spending. Nevertheless, quantitative simulations have shown that
households opposed to government spending often are in favor of a balanced budget requirement.
Households do not only diﬀer with respect to their preference for government spending, but
also along many other dimensions. In particular, they have diﬀerent levels of productivity and
income, which triggers the question of whether productivity diﬀerences signiﬁcantly aﬀect the
results of the previous section. To answer this question, it is useful to distinguish between level
diﬀerences and slope diﬀerences between a- and b-types’ productivity sequences. Derivations
deferred to the Appendix show that, if productivity diﬀerences only relate to levels, the previ-
ous results remain essentially unchanged. Around the balanced budget allocation, labor supply
is constant across types, and remains at the same level as before; permanent productivity dif-
ferences across types are only reﬂected in corresponding diﬀerences in the consumption levels.
The marginal conditions analyzed in the paper therefore remain unchanged, except for a scaling
of wt.
If households do not only diﬀer with respect to their preference for government spending
and their average productivity, but also with respect to the time proﬁle of their productivity
sequences, a new dimension of intra-generational conﬂict emerges. In this case, the timing of
tax collections does not only aﬀect the level of g, but also redistributes wealth between a- and
b-types. The welfare eﬀects of budget-policy induced redistribution as well as the resolution of
the conﬂicts surrounding budget policy by means of a balanced budget requirement are discussed
9in Niepelt (2004).
10A Productivity-Level Diﬀerences
This Appendix derives the equilibrium conditions of the model under the assumption that pro-
ductivity of a-types is α times as large as the productivity of b-types, wa
t = αwb
t for all t. For
α = 1, the main model follows.
Household i’s ﬁrst-order conditions are given by βtci
0/ci




for all t, as well as the budget constraint. Substituting out prices and tax rates reduces these
ﬁrst-order conditions to the implementability constraints
T X
t=0




























= c for all t.
The ﬁrst two equations combine the households’ budget constraints with the static and dynamic
optimality conditions. The third condition captures the restriction that all households face the
same prices, and the fourth condition states that the marginal rates of substitution between
goods and leisure, adjusted for diﬀerences in productivity, are identical across households (be-
cause both types of consumers are subject to the same marginal tax rates). Using wa
t = αwb
t



























tc for all t,
xa
t = xb

















t for all t. (9)
The resource constraint reads (ηα + 1 − η)(1 − xb
t)wb




(ηα + 1 − η)wb
t(1 − xb
t) − gt
ηα + 1 − η
for all t. (10)
Under a balanced budget requirement, the government must also satisfy the condition (ηα+1−
η)(1 − xb
t)wtτt = gt. Using the household’s intra-temporal ﬁrst-order condition as well as the




for all t. (11)
A competitive equilibrium subject to no balanced budget requirement therefore satisﬁes (8), (9),
and (10), while a competitive equilibrium subject to a balanced budget requirement satisﬁes (9),






θaηξa + θb(1 − η)ξb












depending on whether a balanced budget requirement is in place.
Using (10), cb
t can be eliminated from the government’s program, leaving xb
t, t = 0,...,T,
and g as the sole remaining endogenous variables. Diﬀerentiating the government’s resulting
objective function with respect to xb






























, t = 1,...,T,
θaηξa + θb(1 − η)ξb









t) − g − get
.
These conditions are identical to the ﬁrst-order conditions in the main model, when the produc-
tivity sequence is scaled by factor z.
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Figure 6: Total welfare eﬀect for b-types of moving from balanced budget allocation to tax
















Figure 7: Total welfare eﬀect for b-types of moving from balanced budget allocation to tax
smoothing allocation. Parameter value: ξa = 1.
17